

Message Text

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ACTION PM-03

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 EUR-10 NSC-10 NSCE-00 CIAE-00

INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 SAJ-01 PRS-01 MBFR-02 L-02

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SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

USDEL SALT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 09174

LIMDIS

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL; HELSINKI FOR MPT DEL

E. O. 11652: X- GDS-1

TAGS: PARM, GW. US, UR

SUBJECT: AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR.

REF: BONN 9021

SUMMARY: CHANCELLOR BRANDT AND THE FRG CABINET WILL
CONSIDER ON JUNE 27 THE INITIAL FONOFF/DEFMIN PAPER
ANALYZING THE US/ SOVIET AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION
OF NUCLEAR WAR. THE FONOFF AUTHOR OF THAT PAPER TO
THE CHANCELLOR BRIEFED EMBOFF IN CONFIDENCE ON ITS
CONTENTS JUNE 26; THE PAPER NOTES FIVE POSITIVE AND
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TWO NEGATIVE ELEMENTS OF THE US/ SOVIET AGREEMENT AND REACHES NO SPECIFIC CONCLUSION. THIS TELEGRAM REPORTS ON DETAILS OF THE FRG PAPER AND ON EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE FONOFF DRAFTING OFFICIAL AND EMBOFF. END SUMMARY.

1. POSITIVE ELEMENTS. ACCORDING TO THE GERMAN PAPER, THE FIVE POSITIVE ELEMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS. FIRST, ARTICLE ONE STRESSES THE NEED TO AVOID RISKS OF ANY REPEAT ANY MILITARY CONFRONTATION, THUS EMPHASIZING AND LINKING THE DANGER OF BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR CONFLICTS. SECOND, ARTICLE SIX DIRECTLY REFERS TO AMERICA' S EUROPEAN ALLIES, THEREBY ASSURING THAT THE POSITIVE EFFECTS OF ARTICLE ONE ALSO APPLY TO WESTERN EUROPE. THIRD, THE CONSULTATION CLAUSE IN ARTICLE FOUR GOES MUCH BEYOND SO FAR EXISTING PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES IN THAT THIS ARTICLE ESTABLISHES AN OBLIGATION TO CONSULT IN TIME OF CRISIS. ARTICLE FOUR THUS ESTABLISHES A KIND OF " COMMON CRISIS MANAGEMENT" WHICH WOULD PERTAIN, UNDER ARTICLE ONE, TO THE RISK OF ANY MILITARY CONFRONTATION, CONVENTIONAL AS WELL AS NUCLEAR. THIS GOES CONSIDERABLY BEYOND THE 1971 AGREEMENT ON PREVENTING NUCLEAR WARS BY ACCIDENT. FOURTH, BECAUSE OF THE CLOSE US/ EUROPEAN ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP AND THE EXPLICIT TERMS OF ARTICLE SIX, EUROPE COULD ACTIVELY INFLUENCE SUCH US/ SOVIET CRISES CONSULTATIONS UNDER ARTICLE FOUR AND THUS COULD BRING ITS VIEW TO BEAR ON THE WARSAW PACT. FIFTH, THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF- DEFENSE, AND THUS ALSO DETERRENCE, IS EXPLICITLY REAFFIRMED IN ARTICLE SIX.

2. NEGATIVE ELEMENTS. THE FRG PAPER CITES TWO NEGATIVE ELEMENTS OF THE US/ SOVIET AGREEMENT. FIRST, DESPITE THE FIVE POINTS ENUMERATED IN PARA ONE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR COULD HAVE SERIOUS DELETERIOUS POLITICO/ PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS ON THE ALLIANCE IN GENERAL AND THE US/ GERMAN RELATIONSHIP IN PARTICULAR. THIS WOULD BE THE CASE IF, AS MANY GERMAN NEWSPAPERS ARE ALREADY SPECULATING, THE AGREEMENT WOULD MEAN
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THAT THE US MAY NOT CONTINUE TO AFFORD EUROPE THE PROTECTION OF ITS STRATEGIC NUCLEAR UMBRELLA. IT IS A POSSIBLE BUT NOT A NECESSARY CONCLUSION THAT DECOUPLING COULD BE AN EVENTUAL CONSEQUENCE. IT IS THEREFORE VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE US SIDE EMPHASIZE THAT THESE CONCERNS ARE BASELESS IN ORDER QUICKLY TO DEFLATE PUBLIC AND OFFICIAL CONCERN OVER THIS

POTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL DANGER. SECOND, THE AGREEMENT
WOULD APPEAR TO BE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE.
BUT AS A MANIFESTATION OF INTENSIFIED SOVIET/ AMERICAN
BILATERALISM, IT DOES RAISE THE QUESTION, TAKEN
TOGETHER WITH THE RECENT TESTIMONY OF SECDEF- DESIGNATE
SCHLESINGER AND THE RECENT EMPHASIS ON NON- NUCLEAR
COMPONENTS OF ALLIED DEFENSE IN THE KISSINGER SPEECH
AND THE PRESIDENT' S FOREIGN POLICY REPORT, WHETHER
THE US IS NOW ACCORDING A HIGHER VALUE TO US THAN TO
HILLENBRAND

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ACTION PM-03

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 EUR-10 NSC-10 NSCE-00 CIAE-00

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EUROPEAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS. IF THIS WERE THE CASE,
IT WOULD CREATE A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION FOR
EUROPEAN/ ALLIED AS WELL AS FOR GERMAN SECURITY.

3. AFTER THANKING FONOFF REP FOR HIS PRESENTATION, EMBOFF SAID HE WISHED TO COMMENT ON THE TWO " NEGATIVE ELEMENTS". ON THE FIRST POINT, EMBOFF EMPHASIZED DR. KISSINGER' S COMMENTS TO THE PRESS THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR IS " EXACTLY THAT, THE PREVENTION OF WAR". IT WAS THE US PURPOSE NOT TO SUPPLANT BUT RATHER TO SUPPLEMENT THE BASIC SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN NATO BY OBTAINING A POLITICAL COMMITMENT FROM THE OTHER

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SUPER- POWER TO " ACT IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF SITUATIONS" CAPABLE OF CAUSING THE DANGERS ENUMERATED IN ARTICLE ONE. EMBOFF NOTED THAT DR. KISSINGER ALSO TOLD THE PRESS THAT VIOLATIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT " WOULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WHOLE CONTEXT OF US/ SOVIET RELATIONS". IN SHORT, THE US/ SOVIET AGREEMENT DID NOT PRESCRIBE RULES TO GOVERN THE CONDUCT OF WAR BUT RATHER WAS DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF A WAR BY EMBODYING THE POLITICAL COMMITMENT OF THE US AND USSR TO A COURSE OF SELF- RESTRAINT AS WELL AS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SAFER AND MORE SECURE INTERNATIONAL ORDER WHICH ALL THE POWERS WOULD HAVE AN INTEREST IN PRESERVING AND MAINTAINING. AS TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES MENTIONED IN THE GERMAN PAPER, EMBOFF ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH DANGERS EXISTED, RECALLING DR. KISSINGER' S JUNE 25 REMARK TO THE PRESS THAT THE PRESENT PERIOD REQUIRES GREAT SOPHISTICATION ON THE PART OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. EMBOFF SAID THIS REMARK DOUBTLESS WAS TRUE FOR THE CITIZENS OF ALL ALLIED COUNTRIES AND EXPRESSED THE WISH THAT SENIOR GERMAN OFFICIALS ALSO WOULD UNDERSCORE THE CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLIANCE IN AN AGE OF GROWING DETENTE. BUT EMBOFF ALSO NOTED THAT THE AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR FOR SOVIET LEADERS AS WELL SHOULD THOSE OFFICIALS BE FACED WITH ANOTHER SITUATION SUCH AS THEY CONFRONTED IN 1968 IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. INDEED, THIS WAS ONE OF THE MAJOR PURPOSES OF THE AGREEMENT IN QUESTION.

4. AS TO THE SECOND NEGATIVE POINT CONCERNING SOVIET/ AMERICAN BILATERALISM AND US/ EUROPEAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS, EMBOFF SAID THAT THE US LIKE THE FRG WAS ENGAGED IN AN EFFORT TO MOVE BEYOND THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION OF THE LAST QUARTER CENTURY BUT INTENDED TO DO THIS IN FULL CONSULTATION WITH ITS ALLIES AND WITH A CLEAR EYE ON THE NEEDS TO ASSURE, TOGETHER WITH ITS ALLIED PARTNERS, MILITARY SECURITY

IN THE WEST. AS TO STRATEGIC INTERESTS, EMBOFF NOTED
THAT DR. KISSINGER REPLIED DURING HIS JUNE 21 PRESS
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CONFERENCE TO A QUESTION CONCERNING FBS BY SAYING
" WE WILL MAKE NO AGREEMENT THAT SEPARATES
OUR SECURITY INTERESTS FROM THOSE OF OUR ALLIES AND
THAT WE BELIEVE THAT IN THIS PHASE THE CENTRAL
STRATEGIC SYSTEMS SHOULD BY THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF
NEGOTIATION".

5. FONOFF OFFICIAL THANKED EMBOFF FOR HIS COMMENTS AND
SAID THIS ARGUMENTATION WOULD BE FACTORED INTO THE
FONOFF/ DEFMIN PAPER TO BE CONSIDERED AT THE JUNE 27
FRG CABINET COMMITTEE SESSION.
HILLENBRAND

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